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Abstract  
Using a rich panel data set, we provide a rigorous analysis of the relationship between access 
to external finance, foreign direct investment and the exports of private enterprises in China. 
We conclude that, in order to foster the exports of indigenous enterprises, the elimination of 
financial discrimination against private firms is likely to be a more effective policy tool than 
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Although China has won many plaudits for its rapid transformation from an autarky to the world's 
largest recipient of foreign direct investment and a regional export powerhouse, some economists are 
less sanguine about the Chinese government's long-standing policy that encourages export-oriented 
FDI. Their main concern seems to be that foreign firms, especially those in labour-intensive industries, 
divert exports away from financially constrained indigenous private enterprises, and argue that the 
huge flow of FDI into the country should not necessarily be an indicator of the strength of the economy. 
This criticism of export-oriented FDI in China motivates this paper.  
 
Two research questions are addressed: (i) is there a link between access to finance and firms’ exports? 
and (ii) what is the impact of FDI on the exporting behaviour of indigenous enterprises? Our study 
draws on a rich panel data set of more than 28,000 domestic private enterprises from the Chinese 
manufacturing sector, spanning the period 1999-2002. This is an interesting period as it coincides with 
China's accession to the WTO and the further opening of the economy to foreign investors. We find 
that access to bank loans is associated with greater export market orientation, especially amongst 
politically unaffiliated firms in labour-intensive industries. Export-oriented horizontal FDI is also found to 
have a robust export enhancing effect, and this positive externality is larger for firms which enjoy better 
access to finance. By contrast, positive export spillovers through horizontal or vertical linkages with 
multinationals are few and far between.  
 
These findings suggest that rather than rely on FDI to generate export spillovers, the elimination of 
financial discrimination against private firms is a more effective way of boosting the exports of 
indigenous enterprises. Thus the paper has the important broad implication that the expansion of 
exports is an additional reason why China should undertake the reform of its state-dominated banking 
system. 
 1. Introduction 
Although China has won many plaudits for its rapid transformation from an autarky 
to the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI)
1 and a regional export 
power-house, some economists - most notably Huang (2003, 2004)-  are  less sanguine 
about the Chinese government's long-standing policy that encourages export-oriented FDI. 
Their main concern seems to be that foreign firms, especially those in labour-intensive 
industries, divert exports away from financially-constrained indigenous private enterprises.  
The Chinese banking system has a reputation of lending bias against private firms 
(e.g. Allen et al, 2005). Until 1998, the four state-owned commercial banks which dominate 
the banking system in China
2 were instructed not to lend to private enterprises. Huang 
(2003) contends that because of this financial repression, domestic private firms found it 
difficult to engage in contractual arrangements with foreign buyers
3, creating a fertile 
condition for foreign firms to extend equity financing instead.  According to this line of 
argument, a large proportion of export-oriented FDI in China is due to the bias of the 
financial system that favours stagnant state-owned enterprises over more dynamic private 
enterprises. As such, the huge flow of FDI into the country should not necessarily be an 
indicator of the strength of the economy. 
This criticism of   export-oriented FDI in China motivates this paper. Two research 
questions are addressed:  (i) is there a link between access to finance and firms’ exports? 
and (ii) what is the impact of FDI on the exporting behaviour of indigenous enterprises?  
 The theoretical trade literature has examined the first question from a different 
perspective. Within an augmented Heckscher-Ohlin model, Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) 
                                                           
1  See “Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment”. OECD Directorate for Financial, 
Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs.  June  2004 
2  These four banks are the only financial institutions that have branches in almost all locations in China, and 
by 2001 they accounted for nearly two thirds of loans outstanding and deposits (Boyreau-Debra and Wei, 
2005). 
  1offer a theory which predicts that countries with well functioning financial systems tend to 
export goods produced in industries that are heavily dependent on external finance.  More 
recently, Chaney (2005) shows that in the presence of fixed costs associated with exporting, 
some firms do not export because of liquidity constraints. The second question was first 
explored empirically by Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997) and their work has spawned 
related firm level studies across a variety of countries. This paper contributes to the 
literature by modelling the interaction between finance, FDI and individual firms’ exports 
in what is arguably the most important emerging economy in the world.  
The economic literature abounds with studies that examine the relationship between 
aggregate growth and finance, but there is little research relating to the specific mechanisms 
linking finance and growth, especially at a micro level (see Levine 2005 for an extensive 
review)
4.  By focusing on firm level exports, this paper also contribute to research which 
sheds empirical light on the various channels through which financial development 
promotes growth.  
Our study draws on a rich panel data set of more than 28,000 domestic private 
enterprises from the Chinese manufacturing sector, spanning the period 1999-2002. This is 
an interesting period as it coincides with China's accession to the WTO and the further 
opening of the economy to foreign investors. Four key results emerge from the analysis: (i) 
Access to bank loans is associated with greater export market orientation, especially 
amongst politically unaffiliated firms in labour-intensive industries; (ii) Export-oriented 
horizontal FDI has a robust export enhancing effect, and this effect is more pronounced 
amongst firms with more finance; (iii) Domestic market seeking horizontal FDI has a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 For example, due to their inability to import   machinery and equipment necessary to comply with an export 
contract. 
4 Based on cross country growth regressions, Alfaro et al (2004) find that financial development speeds up the 
rate of FDI-induced economic growth rates. 
  2deleterious effect on the export market orientation of indigenous firms; (iv)  positive export 
spillovers through vertical linkages with multinational firms are few and far between.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II offers a short 
overview of the development of FDI in China. Section III discusses the theoretical literature 
linking FDI, finance and exports. Section IV presents the empirical model, and Section V 
describes the data and offers some preliminary analysis. The main findings of the paper are 
discussed in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
 
2. Foreign-invested firms in China 
This section provides a brief overview of the trend of FDI flows into China over the 
past quarter of a century
5. When the Chinese government initiated economic reforms in the 
late 1970s, FDI was allowed only in designated Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
6, and 
foreign investors were required to have local partners. At that time, FDI was seen by 
Chinese policy makers as an important vehicle of its export-led and import substitution 
development strategy. As a result, SEZs granted foreign investors concessionary tax 
policies and exemption from export and import duties for equipment and machinery 
employed in the production of export products.   
Following the passage of the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law in 1986, firms 
with 100% foreign capital were allowed to operate in the country for the first time and by 
1988 China’s Open Door Policy towards FDI extended to the entire coastal zone. The main 
purpose of this policy initiative was to develop labour-intensive industries that specialise in 
export processing of imported raw materials. This export-oriented FDI policy has evidently 
been spectacularly successful, as China is now described as “the export processing zone of 
the world” (Lin, 2002). The policy of further liberalisation of the economy initiated in 1992 
                                                           
5 Some of the material in this section draws on Chen (1997) and Lemoine (2000). 
  3witnessed a dramatic surge in multinational activity in China (see Figure 1).  Foreign 
investors were offered better opportunities to sell their products in the domestic market. As 
policy makers started to view FDI as a channel of international knowledge transfer which 
would minimise the need for technology imports, high-tech investors were particularly 
encouraged. 
FDI in China is characterised by an uneven regional distribution. During the period 
1987-2000, about 87% of cumulative FDI was located in the coastal regions (Wei, 2003).  
This was mainly a reflection of the initial policy that restricted FDI to coastal regions. The 
proximity of those regions to Hong Kong and Taiwan, the main sources of foreign 
investment, also contributed to these geographical disparities.  Although Western and 
Central regions are gradually attracting more foreign investors, the skewed distribution of 
FDI in favour of the coastal regions has raised serious concerns that FDI might exacerbate 
existing regional inequalities (e.g. Bils, 2005).  
Investment from the Chinese Diaspora of Hong Kong , Taiwan and Macao 
accounted for more than  60% of the  total accumulated FDI stock in China between 1983 
and 1998 (OECD, 2000). This investment is predominantly export-oriented and tends to 
concentrate in labour intensive sectors.  During this period, multinationals from Japan, 
USA and Western Europe represented 8.2%, 8.1% and 6.7% of FDI, respectively. Foreign 
investment from these OECD countries is predominantly in more capital-intensive sectors 
and is increasingly being motivated by the desire for access to the huge domestic market.  
  Manufacturing enterprises in China finance their investment from four main 
sources:  (i) state budgets; (ii) domestic bank loans, (iii) self-raised finance, such as that 
obtained from domestic capital markets and retained earnings, and (iv) foreign financing.  
A typical foreign-invested enterprise uses a mixture of all sources of finance listed above. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 The SEZs consisted of three in Guangdong Province: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen in Fujian 
Province. 
  4Between 1999 and 2002, finance from state budgets, domestic bank loans, self-raised 
finance and foreign sources accounted for 8%, 20%, 17%, and 55% respectively of the total 
finance of foreign invested firms in Chinese manufacturing
7. These figures show that 
multinational firms operating in China make significant use of domestic financial resources. 
 
3. Access to finance, exports and FDI: theoretical considerations 
Access to finance and exports 
International trade theory suggests that financial sector development is a source of 
comparative advantage and consequently a determinant of international trade flows. Kletzer 
and Bardhan (1987) extend the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model by introducing a financial 
sector and predict that a country with a well-developed financial sector will have 
comparative advantage in the export of goods produced in industries that rely more on 
external financing. Baldwin (1989) develops a model in which finance is an instrument of 
risk diversification, and shows that firms in financially developed countries enjoy better 
opportunities for diversification, and therefore specialise in the export of risky goods
8. 
Recently Chaney (2005) proposes a theory of international trade which predicts that in the 
presence of sunk costs associated with exporting, firms with liquidity constraints tend to be 
non-exporters.   
Several channels through which finance generates growth are identified in the 
theoretical literature. First, financial intermediaries are deemed to be effective at picking 
entrepreneurs who are more likely to engage in innovative activities. The notion that 
finance plays a positive role in enhancing the rate of technological innovation dates back to 
                                                           
7 The figures are calculated based on the dataset used in this paper. 
8 Beck (2002) and Svalerdy and Vlachos (2005) offer empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
finance influences the pattern of international trade. 
  5Schumpeter, and recent authors who have explored this idea include De la Fuente and 
Martin (1996) and Morales (2003). Second, a well-functioning financial system has a 
positive influence on human capital accumulation. For example, Jacoby (1994) shows how 
access to credit facilitates the process of skill upgrading.  Third, financial institutions 
stimulate economic development by monitoring managers and ensuring that effective 
corporate governance mechanisms are in place (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983 and Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). This is expected to induce managers to maximise firm value rather than 
engage in rent-seeking transactions at the expense of shareholders. Fourth, debts diminish 
the amount of free cash flow to managers, giving them the incentive to reduce managerial 
slack and seek innovative ways to boost efficiency (e.g. Aghion et al, 1999).  Finally, a 
well-oiled financial system ameliorates growth prospects by allowing individual agents to 
diversify and increase their propensity to undertake high return but risky projects. This idea 
is explored theoretically from different perspectives by Acemolglu and Zilibotti (1997) and 
King and Levine (1993), amongst others. In light of the well-established proposition that 
firms which are more efficient, fast growing, invest in technology and skill upgrading have 
greater likelihood to export [e.g. Bernard et al 2003; Clerides et al, 1998 and Aw et al, 
1999], it can reasonably be hypothesised that access to finance may enhance firms’ 
propensity to export as long as it is growth-enhancing. 
FDI and export spillovers 
The mechanisms through which intra-industry spillovers from FDI occur are well-
understood in the literature (see Görg and Greenway, 2004, for a recent review). The entry 
of multinational firms can impact on domestic firms’ output, employment and efficiency 
through enhanced competition, technology diffusion, export market access and employee 
training. In particular, FDI may stimulate the exports of domestic enterprises by providing 
  6information on international markets and marketing strategies or by enhancing the 
competitiveness of indigenous firms and by demonstrating new management techniques 
(Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997).  
The early literature has focused on intra-industry FDI spillovers, but Rodrıguez-
Clare (1996) provides the first theoretical analysis of inter-industry linkage effects 
generated by multinationals. In a related paper, Markusen and Venables (1999) offer a 
model in which the entry of multinational firms has two contrasting effects on the domestic 
economy: FDI crowds out domestic producers of final goods via a competition effect, but at 
the same time creates favourable conditions to indigenous firms via linkage effects by, for 
example, increasing the demand of intermediate goods. It is worth noting, however, that 
neither Rodrıguez-Clare (1996) nor Markusen and Venables (1999) have explored 
explicitly the export-FDI nexus.  
 
4. Empirical approach 
This section describes the empirical approach employed to identify the relationship 
between FDI, access to finance and exporting intensity, defined as the share of exports in 
total sales. A firm (indexed by i) either exports at time t with positive exporting intensity or 
it does not. We formulate a Tobit model of exporting intensity in terms of a latent variable 
model as: 
) 1 ( ) , 0 ( ~
], ) * ( , 0 max[
2
5 4 3 2 1
σ ε
ε γ γ γ γ γ
N
D Bank FDI Bank FDI X Export ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt + + + + + =
       
where FDI is a vector of indices of foreign presence
9 in industry j at time t; Bank denotes 
bank loans normalised by total assets and X is a vector of firm level characteristics 
                                                           
9 The construction and definition of the variables used the FDI indices will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
  7comprising of new product innovation, age, total factor productivity growth
10, labour 
training expenditure (normalised by total wage bills), size and self-raised finance 
normalised by total assets. The choice of these control variables is guided by theoretical 
considerations and existing empirical evidence [e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Clerides et 
al, 1998 and Aw et al, 1999].  Finally D is the full set of industry, time and region dummies 
and ε is a random error term. 
Arguably a number of regressors in Equation (1) such as horizontal FDI, firm size, 
productivity growth, labour training expenditure and bank loans are potentially 
endogenous. Foreign firms are likely to invest in sectors where domestic firms have higher 
a propensity to export. Also, exporting firms may have some unobserved characteristics 
which are systematically correlated with their ability to raise finance. These considerations 
motivate us to use an instrumental variables approach for Tobit models which is due to 
Smith and Blundell (1986)
11.  
Lagged values of the endogenous regressors are used as instruments, but we also 
use three additional external instruments. The first is a dummy variable indicating the 
political/bureaucratic affiliation of the firm.  A significant proportion of Chinese privately 
owned firms is affiliated to some level of government (such as central and local 
government) for so-called “supervisory” purposes. This type of bureaucratic affiliation can 
help firms obtain credit guarantees (Huang, 2004). As such this variable is likely to be a 
relevant instrument for the finance variable
12. The remaining two additional variables are 
designed to instrument both FDI and access to finance, and these are the output share of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the proportion of loss making SOEs in the firms’ sector 
                                                           
10 Total factor productivity (FP) is calculated using the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which 
accounts for the endogeneity of inputs in the production function estimation.   
11 Also see Wooldridge (2003). Newey (1987) suggests a maximum likelihood estimator for discrete models 
with endogenous regressors.  But his estimator fails to converge within our model – a commonly encountered 
problem when there is more than one endogenous regressor.  
  8and region. These variables affect the extent of bank access by private firms, given the 
lending bias in favour of SOEs, particularly poorly performing ones. Moreover, Huang 
(2003) argues convincingly that a sizeable proportion of recent FDI (especially   joint 
ventures and acquisitions) in China has resulted from the insolvency problems facing 
SOEs. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that the output share of SOEs and the proportion of 
loss making SOEs are also sensible instruments for FDI.    
The estimation of Tobit models with endogenous regressors involves two steps: (i) 
running a linear regression of each endogenous regressor on the instrumental variables and 
all other exogenous regressors, and (ii) estimating the Tobit model by including the residual 
terms from step (i) in the list of covariates. The residuals are correction terms for the 
endogeneity problem, and jointly significant coefficients on these terms can be taken as 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the relevant regressors are indeed endogenous.   
 
5. Database description and preliminary analysis 
Our empirical analysis draws on the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of China
13, covering all firms with an 
annual turnover for over five million Renminbi (about $60000).  It is estimated that these 
firms account for more than 85% of industrial output in China. The report is a rich source 
of firm level characteristics such as firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, 
geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output, value added, and 
product innovation, sources of finance, exports, and employee training expenditure.
14  The 
data available to us cover the period 1999 to 2002.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 An exploratory analysis suggests the importance of political affiliation for access of finance. However, we 
leave a more systematic examination of the political economy of access to finance in China for future work. 
13 Various sub-samples of this data base are now being used in the economic literature. See, for example,   Hu 
et al. (2005) and Wei (2005). 
14 Nominal values are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook 2004. 
  9To capture the extent of foreign presence in each industry-region j at time t, we define 
the degree of horizontal FDI, say , as the proportion of industry-region output 
accounted for by multinational companies
jt HFDI
15 . This and all other indices of FDI are 
constructed for 171 three-digit industries within each of the 31 provinces of China. As a 
result, the FDI variables used in this study show very good sample variability. 
Based on    we calculate two indices of foreign presence in backward and 
forward linked industries in line with existing practice (cf. Smarzynska- Javorcik, 2004).  
Backward linkage with FDI in industry j at time t is a proxy for the foreign presence in the 
industries supplied by industry j at time t, and is computed as: 
jt HFDI




kt kj jt HFDI DFDI α        ( 2 )  
where αkj is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to industry k
16.  It is assumed that 
the greater the proportion of output supplied to an industry with foreign multinational 
presence, the greater the degree of linkage between foreign and local firms.  We refer to 
this as downstream FDI.  
The index of FDI in upstream sectors is calculated in a similar fashion as:  




kt kj jt HFDI UFDI β
where  kj β   represents the proportion of sector k’s output supplied to industry j.  T h i s  
measure of FDI, which we label upstream FDI, captures the extent of forward linkages 
local firms in downstream sectors have with MNEs in supplying sectors.   
Each of the three FDI indices (viz. HFDI, DFDI and UFDI) is further distinguished by 
the market orientation of the foreign investment (domestic market seeking versus export-
                                                           
15 Horizontal FDI can also be defined as foreign equity participation weighted by output share and averaged 
over all firm in the sector (Smarzynska- Javorcik, 2004), or weighted by employment share instead (Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999). The different measures of horizontal FDI are found to be highly correlated, however.   
16 This information is obtained from the 1997 input-output table of China.     
  10oriented), based on the domestic market sales and export values reported by multinational 
enterprises.  
Table 1 gives the average output share and exporting intensity of privately owned and 
foreign-owned firms in the database for 1999 and 2002.  It is apparent that foreign-owned 
firms (defined as those with at least 25% share of foreign capital) have significant presence 
in both labour intensive and capital-intensive industries.  But it also clear from Table 1 that 
foreign-owned firms have substantial interest in serving domestic markets too. It is worth 
noting that, while the output share of private firms has more than doubled between 1999 
and 2002, their average exporting intensity did not exhibit a significant change.  Finally, the 
figures in Table 1 confirm the well-established proposition that the geographic distribution 
of international commerce activity in China is highly uneven. 
[Table 1 here] 
The econometric analysis is based on some 28,400 privately owned enterprises that 
have not received any funds from either foreign channels or state budgets during the sample 
period. Thus their main sources of finance are bank loans and self-raised finance. Table 2 
provides some summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. About a fifth of the 
firms have some exporting experience, and this does not vary much between labour and 
capital intensive sectors.  It is also interesting to note that the average exporting intensity 
amongst exporters is quite high.  
As might be expected, firms in capital-intensive sectors devote more resources to 
the training and skill upgrading of their employees, while firms in labour intensive sectors 
employ, on average, 9% more workers than capital intensive ones. The firms in our dataset 
have registered an impressive average TFP growth of more than 10%, consistent with the 
notion that private enterprises are the main drivers of China’s recent economic growth (e.g. 
Allen et, 2005). Average bank loan normalised by total assets is more than 50%, indicating 
  11the appetite private entrepreneurs in China have for bank credit. The ratio of self-raised 
finance to total assets is also quite high.  
[Table 2 here] 
We now turn to a discussion of the main findings of the paper. 
 
6. Main findings and discussion 
The   instrumental variables model is estimated for the whole sample and for labour 
intensive and capital-intensive sectors separately. We do this for two reasons: (i) much of 
the initial concern regarding export-oriented FDI related to labour intensive sectors (e.g. 
Huang, 2003), and (ii) the two sectors are likely to face different external financing 
requirements due to their technological differences (cf. Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
The marginal effects from the Tobit models are reported in Table 3. The null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of regressors is emphatically rejected in all models, vindicating 
the use of the instrumental variables estimator. In line with existing empirical evidence, 
firm size and productivity growth are found to exert positive and economically significant 
impacts on the propensity to export. For example, according to the IV Tobit model, a 10 
percentage points increase in firm size is associated with a 3 percentage points increase in 
exporting intensity for the average firm. Product innovation is also found to have positive 
effects on exporting. The exporting impact of product innovation is more pronounced in 
capital intensive sectors, where the deployment of new product processes is arguably more 
crucial for competition in international markets.  By contrast, the export market effect of 
employee training is more important in labour intensive industries, suggesting that skill 
upgrading is particularly important in traditional industries seeking to engage in 
international commerce. 
[Table 3 here] 
  12Access to finance, FDI and exports 
The estimates indicate that access to formal financial channels (i.e. bank loans) 
enhances the exporting intensity of private firms in China. This effect is more pronounced 
in labour-intensive industries. By contrast, the exporting impact of self-raised finance is 
insignificant in capital intensive industries.  Thus it seems that exports in capital-intensive 
are highly dependent on access to external financing and cannot be financed through 
internal cash flows alone. This is an interesting finding in view of the idea developed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) that a firm’s dependence on external finance is a function of its 
technological characteristics. 
We find that export spillovers from FDI in China exhibit substantial heterogeneity. 
Firstly, export-oriented horizontal FDI has a robust export enhancing effect, consistent with 
the belief that exporting multinationals transmit information about the international markets 
to their local counterparts. Secondly, this positive externality from export-oriented FDI is 
more marked in labour-intensive industries and for firms with more access to bank loans. 
Thus access to finance not only has an unconditional impact on exporting, but also helps 
domestic firms take better advantage of the externalities generated by exporting 
multinationals in their sector. Thirdly, market seeking horizontal FDI has a deleterious 
effect on the export market orientation of domestic firms. This effect is more pronounced 
amongst firms in labour intensive industries with access to bank loans. One interpretation 
of this result would be that domestic enterprises in labour intensive industries need to 
borrow more to invest in protecting their domestic market shares from market seeking 
multinationals.  Fourthly, export-oriented FDI in downstream sectors does not have any 
sizeable impact on the export of domestic firms. This would appear to suggest that 
exporting multinationals in China do not substantially source locally – or at least their 
interaction with their domestic intermediate input suppliers does not generate significant 
  13exporting opportunities for the latter. Fifthly, market-seeking FDI in downstream sectors 
leads to a decrease in domestic firms’ exporting intensity. It seems that indigenous 
enterprises supplying intermediate inputs to domestically-oriented multinationals tend to be 
more domestically-oriented themselves, other things constant.  Finally, we found no 
significant relationship between domestic exports and FDI in upstream sectors, irrespective 
of the market orientation of multinationals.  
Are private firms with political affiliation different? 
Many privately owned enterprises in China are affiliated to some level of 
government administration. Such privately owned firms with political connections are 
colloquially known as “red-hat” firms (Huang, 2004). The function of the relevant 
government body is to offer credit guarantees and political protection, in return for some 
“management fees”
 17.  
We conjecture that politically affiliated firms face “softer” budget constraints since 
they are likely to be bailed out by the relevant state body should they default on their loans. 
An interesting question in this respect is whether politically unaffiliated or “purely” private 
firms make more efficient use of external finance compared to their “red-hat” counterparts.  
To explore this issue, we divide the firms in our sample into “purely” private and “red-hat”, 
and estimate the exporting intensity equation on each sub-sample. The results are reported 
in Table 4 and they indicate that “purely” private firms utilise bank loans more efficiently, 
as far as the growth of export is concerned. Interestingly, the export-promoting effect of 
bank loans is insignificant for “red-hat” firms in capital-intensive industries. While it is 
well documented that the Chinese financial system channels substantial resources towards 
inefficient state-owned enterprises (Allen et al, 2005 and Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005), 
                                                           
17 Of course bureaucratic/political affiliation may also have its downside, as “red-hat” firms are likely to 
encounter some managerial interference from state bureaucrats. 
  14our finding provides preliminary evidence that resource misallocation by the banking sector 
induced by political bias exists even when the analysis is confined to the private sector. 
[Table 4] 
Policy implications: 
Until the late 1990s, private enterprises in China were allowed only to export 
through state-owned trading corporations. Even then, they did not have the right to retain 
foreign exchange earnings from their exports in a bank account. While this type of blatant 
discrimination no longer prevails, private firms still suffer from financial repression, 
especially those without political connections.  
In emerging nations like China, exporting benefits firms in many ways. Most 
notably, it is a channel of international technology transfer (Kraay, 1999), creates jobs and 
generates vital foreign exchange, and hence facilitates the imports of technology. Our 
finding that more finance generally means more exports, whereas more FDI (especially 
market-oriented FDI) can mean fewer export, has an important policy implication. To foster 
the exports of domestic firms, restructuring the financial system is a more potent policy 
option than relying on FDI spillovers.  This is even more relevant as the scope for ensuring 
the flow of the “right kind” of FDI which generates export spillovers is now rather limited, 
since placing performance requirements on foreign investors is against the rules of   the 
WTO, which China joined in 2001.  
 
7. Conclusions  
Using a rich panel data set comprising more than 28,000 privately owned 
enterprises in China, this paper provides a systematic analysis of the relationship between 
access to finance, FDI and the export of domestic firms.  Controlling for the endogeneity 
and heterogeneity of finance and FDI, we find that access to bank loans is associated with 
  15greater export market orientation, especially amongst politically unaffiliated firms in 
labour-intensive industries.  Export-oriented horizontal FDI is also found to have a robust 
export enhancing effect, and this positive externality is larger for firms which enjoy better 
access to finance. By contrast, domestic market seeking horizontal FDI has a deleterious 
effect on the export orientation of indigenous firms and robust positive export spillovers 
through vertical linkages with multinationals are rather rare.  These findings suggest that 
rather than rely on FDI to generate export spillovers, the elimination of financial 
discrimination against private firms is a more effective way of boosting the exports of 
indigenous enterprises. The present paper has the important broad implication that the 
expansion of exports is an additional reason why China should undertake the reform of its 
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  19Table 1: 
Output share and export intensity   of PRIVATE and foreign-invested enterprises 
(FIE) by industry and region: 
  PRIVATE firms  FIE enterprises 
  Output Share  Export intensity  Output Share  Export intensity 
Industry   1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002 
        Capital intensive  0.037 0.114 0.129 0.149 0.298 0.308 0.439 0.44 
         Labour intensive  0.044 0.123 0.135 0.148 0.311 0.336 0.434 0.44 
Region            
       Coastal  0.042 0.123 0.184 0.185 0.397 0.407 0.472 0.472
      Central   0.038 0.111 0.039 0.064 0.11 0.134 0.185 0.213
      Western  0.042 0.105 0.029 0.026 0.088 0.089 0.141 0.146
 
       Notes: 
1.  Authors’ calculations based on the database used in this paper. 
2.  The following industry are defined as capital intensive: Chemical, electronics, machinery, instruments, automobile, 





Table 2: Summary statistics of variables used in the regressions 
 




  Mean Std.  dv. Mean Std.  dv. Mean Std.  dv. 
Export  dummy  0.2138 0.4100 0.2202 0.4144 0.2042 0.4031 
Export  intensity  (exporters)  0.6574 0.3581 0.6979 0.3436 0.5921 0.3712 
Product  innovation  /total  output  0.0190 0.1138 0.0120 0.0910 0.0294 0.1406 
Training  expenditure/employment  0.0598 0.3189 0.0456 0.2565 0.0810 0.3933 
Size  (log  employment)  4.6273 0.9386 4.6714 0.9497 4.5611 0.9179 
Total  factor  productivity  growth  0.1038 0.7663 0.1012 0.7649 0.1078 0.7683 
Age  9.2191 7.7256 8.9452 7.4422 9.6290 8.1145 
Bank  loans/total  assets  0.5135 0.2898 0.5020 0.2929 0.5308 0.2841 
Self  raised  finance/  total  assets  0.3017 0.3211 0.3126 0.3538 0.2854 0.2639 
Horizontal  export-oriented  FDI  0.1045 0.1468 0.1181 0.1557 0.0842 0.1297 
Horizontal  market-seeking  FDI  0.1434 0.1336 0.1471 0.1315 0.1379 0.1364 
Upstream  export-oriented  FDI  0.0007 0.0086 0.0006 0.0107 0.0007 0.0036 
Upstream  market-seeking  FDI  0.0009 0.0097 0.0009 0.0120 0.0009 0.0046 
Downstream  export-oriented  FDI  0.0008 0.0047 0.0010 0.0055 0.0003 0.0030 
Downstream    market-seeking  FDI  0.0012 0.0094 0.0016 0.0117 0.0004 0.0041 
Observations  40910 24526 16384 
 
  20 Table 3: Access to bank loans, exports and FDI spillovers 
Dependent variable: Exporting 
Intensity 
IV TOBIT 




Product innovation   0.268  0.209  0.231 
 (0.106)**  (0.209)  (0.139)* 
Training expenditure  0.144  0.481  0.073 
 (0.048)***  (0.086)***  (0.074) 
Size 0.300  0.233  0.361 
 (0.013)***  (0.025)***  (0.022)*** 
Productivity growth  0.086  0.079  0.103 
 (0.024)***  (0.026)***  (0.039)*** 
Age   -0.005  -0.000  -0.010 
 (0.001)***  (0.002)  (0.001)*** 
Bank loans  0.787  0.956  0.406 
 (0.110)***  (0.106)***  (0.103)*** 
Self-raised finance  0.162  0.251  -0.076 
 (0.075)**  (0.071)***  (0.202) 
HE FDI   0.818  0.534  0.910 
 (0.321)**  (0.235)**  (0.340)*** 
HE FDI * bank loans  0.410  1.386  -0.087 
 (0.629)  (0.437)***  (0.616) 
HM  FDI   -1.254  -1.446  -1.103 
 (0.277)***  (0.376)***  (0.482)** 
HM FDI * bank loans  -1.614  -2.193  -1.072 
 (0.532)***  (0.778)***  (0.895) 
UE FDI   1.924  -11.769  7.238 
 (7.916)  (14.037)  (13.496) 
UE FDI * bank loans  -5.720  13.061  -13.777 
 (15.514)  (20.922)  (23.228) 
UM  FDI   -3.808  6.645  -5.365 
 (6.972)  (10.510)  (8.763) 
UM FDI * bank loans  3.551  -12.121  9.981 
 (13.817)  (16.950)  (16.826) 
DE FDI   -0.143  5.766  -20.921 
 (2.542)  (3.965)  (16.419) 
DE FDI * bank loans  16.662  13.977  19.862 
 (4.927)***  (7.164)*  (23.099) 
DM  FDI   -4.035  -2.994  -23.380 
 (2.227)*  (1.830)  (10.603)** 
DM FDI * bank loans  4.361  3.059  27.223 
 (2.774)  (2.131)  (11.920)** 
Observations 40898  24519  16379 
Number of firms       
Erogeneity test;   (p-value) 
2






Note 1: Asymptotic standard errors   in parentheses. 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Note 3: All specifications include time, regional and industry dummies. 
  21Table 4:  
Bank loans and exports spillovers from FDI: “purely” private 
 versus “red hat” firms 
Dependent variable: Exporting 
Intensity 
“Purely” private firms  “Red hat” firms  








Product  innovation    0.334 0.319 0.264 0.262 0.290 0.210 
 (0.188)*  (0.288)  (0.159)* (0.147)* (0.330)  (0.261) 
Training  expenditure  0.158 0.352 0.105 0.049 0.546 -0.045 
  (0.060)*** (0.112)*** (0.138) (0.056) (0.250)**  (0.058) 
Size  0.250 0.181 0.325 0.379 0.324 0.433 
  (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.029)*** (0.042)*** (0.036)*** 
Productivity  growth  0.049 0.016 0.099 0.082 0.105 0.062 
  (0.032) (0.044) (0.041)**  (0.042)* (0.051)**  (0.032)* 
Age    -0.008 -0.003 -0.013 0.000  0.005  -0.005 
 (0.001)***  (0.002)  (0.002)*** (0.001)  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Bank  loans  0.911 1.039 0.485 0.634 0.852 0.401 
  (0.121)*** (0.138)*** (0.138)*** (0.163)*** (0.184)*** (0.361) 
Self-raised  finance  0.192 0.365 -0.085  0.190 0.213 0.276 
  (0.123) (0.109)***  (0.161) (0.140) (0.189) (0.527) 
HE  FDI    1.459 0.935 1.472 -0.239  -0.044  -0.501 
 (0.439)***  (0.367)**  (0.401)***  (0.408) (0.476) (0.469) 
HE FDI * bank loans  -0.185  1.421  -0.739  1.621  1.342  2.257 
  (0.828) (0.576)**  (0.728) (0.649)** (0.853)  (0.783)*** 
HM    FDI    -1.463 -1.648 -1.432 -0.905 -1.372 -0.388 
  (0.373)*** (0.621)*** (0.500)***  (0.442)** (0.618)** (0.517) 
HM FDI * bank loans  -1.335  -2.062 -0.479 -1.794 -1.731 -2.067 
  (0.721)* (1.196)* (0.775)  (0.972)* (1.152)  (1.194)* 
UE  FDI    10.499 -17.616  26.178 -1.298 0.446  -8.677 
  (11.526) (23.272) (16.446) (9.182)  (20.834) (26.696) 
UE FDI * bank loans  -16.049  24.418  -44.304  0.247  -3.997  19.789 
  (19.615) (28.031) (33.409) (18.177) (37.231) (29.849) 
UM  FDI   -10.950  8.960  -20.320  -2.219  -3.566  -1.803 
  (10.033) (16.595) (24.543) (8.275)  (17.191) (15.267) 
UM FDI * bank loans  7.422  -21.260  25.542  2.181  3.661  5.045 
  (16.469) (22.431) (42.073) (16.390) (32.803) (15.986) 
DE  FDI    -0.374  2.871 -21.201  1.290 9.107 3.508 
  (2.972) (3.411) (16.879)  (5.443) (6.257) (29.949) 
DE  FDI  *  bank  loans  15.696 18.197 21.256 14.326 8.712  -74.973 
  (6.277)**  (6.553)***  (22.272) (9.921)  (10.432) (48.847) 
DM    FDI    0.763  1.601  -7.907 -7.017 -5.355 -83.041 
  (2.995) (4.480) (11.927)  (3.210)**  (2.963)*  (31.737)*** 
DM FDI * bank loans  -1.133  -2.349  6.536  8.615  6.638  98.532 
  (3.627)  (6.021)  (19.530) (4.453)* (3.454)* (40.226)** 
Observations  22626 13559 9067  18272 10960 7312 
N u m b e r   o f   f i r m s         
Exogeneity test:   (p-value) 
2
















  22Figure 1: FDI flows into China, 1979-2003 
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Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
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